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We formulate the head-to-head matchups between Major League Baseball pitchers and batters
from 1954 to 2008 as a bipartite network of mutually-antagonistic interactions. We consider both
the full network and single-season networks, which exhibit interesting structural changes over time.
We find interesting structure in the network and examine their sensitivity to baseball’s rule changes.
We then study a biased random walk on the matchup networks as a simple and transparent way
to compare the performance of players who competed under different conditions and to include
information about which particular players a given player has faced. We find that a player’s position
in the network does not correlate with his success in the random walker ranking but instead has a
substantial effect on its sensitivity to changes in his own aggregate performance.
PACS numbers: 64.60.aq, 02.50.-r, 05.40.Fb, 87.23.-n
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I. INTRODUCTION
The study of networks has experienced enormous
growth in recent years, providing foundational insights
into numerous complex systems ranging from protein in-
teraction networks in biology to online friendship net-
works in the social sciences [1, 2, 3]. Research on ecolog-
ical and organizational networks has provided a general
framework to study the mechanisms that mediate the co-
operation and competition dynamics between individuals
[4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. In these networks, competitive interac-
tions result from the indirect competition between mem-
bers of different populations, who either compete for the
same resources or are linked through consumer-resource
relationships. However, data on mutually-antagonistic
interactions—i.e., individuals who directly fight or com-
pete against each other—have been more difficult to col-
lect [10, 11]. Mutually-antagonistic interactions also oc-
cur frequently in different social contexts such as sports.
In the present paper, we consider head-to-head matchups
between Major League Baseball (MLB) pitchers and bat-
ters: Pitchers benefit by “defeating” batters, and vice
versa. Using data from retrosheet.org [39], we charac-
terize the more than eight million MLB plate appearances
from 1954 to 2008, considering full careers by examining
head-to-head matchups over a multi-season (“career”)
network and single-season performances by constructing
networks for individual seasons.
To compare the performance of players, MLB uses
∗Electronic address: s-saavedra@northwestern.edu
votes by professional journalists to recognize career
achievement of players through induction into a Hall
of Fame (HOF) and single-season performance through
awards such as Most Valuable Player (MVP) and Cy
Young (for pitching performance) [12]. Although the
HOF purports to recognize the best players of all time,
the selection of players to it is widely criticized by fans
and pundits each year because of the lack of consistency
when, e.g., comparing players from different eras, who
play under fundamentally different conditions—in differ-
ent ballparks, facing different players, etc. [13, 14]. Such
arguments come to the fore when attempting to draw
comparisons between players elected to the HOF and
others who did not make it. For instance, how can one
tell whether Jim Rice (elected to the HOF in 2009) had
a better career than Albert Belle (who dropped off the
ballot because of low vote totals after only two years
[40]? Does Bert Blyleven, who appeared on 62.7% of
the HOF ballots in 2009—short of the 75% required for
election—belong in the HOF? Is Sandy Koufax, who
played from 1955-1966 and is in the HOF, better than
Pedro Martinez, who was still active during the 2008 sea-
son and who will presumably eventually be elected to the
HOF? To address such questions, it is insufficient to rely
purely on raw statistics; one must also consider quanti-
tative mechanisms for comparison between athletes who
played under different conditions. We take a first, simple
step in this direction through the study of biased ran-
dom walkers on these graphs [15, 16], allowing us to not
only construct a quantitative, systematic, and transpar-
ent ranking methodology across different eras, but also to
investigate the interplay between these dynamics and the
underlying graph structure and to reveal key properties
2of mutually-antagonistic interactions that can potentially
also be applied in other settings.
While “water-cooler” discussions about the HOF can
often be fascinating, as indicated by the above paragraph,
we stress that the primary goal of our paper is to inves-
tigate interesting features of the baseball networks and
the impact that network structure can have on rankings
rather than on the rankings themselves. While it is nec-
essary to include some example rank orderings for the
purpose of such a discussion, it is important to note that
the rankings we show in the present paper must be taken
with several grains of salt because our efforts at simplic-
ity, which are crucial to highlighting the interplay be-
tween network structure and player rankings, require us
to ignore essential contributing factors (some of which
we will briefly discuss) that are necessary for any serious
ranking of baseball players.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we define and characterize the mutually-
antagonstic baseball networks and study the time evo-
lution of various graph properties. In Section III, we
provide a description of the biased random walker dy-
namics that we employ as a ranking methodology across
eras and for single-season networks. In Section IV, we
study the interplay between the random walker dynamics
and graph structure, paying special attention to the sen-
sitivity of the player rankings. In Section V, we conclude
the paper and discuss a number of potential applications
of our work. We explain additional technical details in
two appendices.
II. NETWORK CHARACTERIZATION AND
EVOLUTION
We analyze baseball’s mutually-antagonistic ecology
by considering bipartite (two-mode) networks of head-to-
head matchups between pitchers and batters. As shown
in Fig. 1, bipartite networks are formed using two dis-
joint sets of vertices, P (pitchers) and B (batters), and
the requirement that every edge connect a vertex in P
to one in B [8, 17, 18] (keeping the pitching and bat-
ting performances of pitchers as two separate nodes).
We consider such interactions in terms of three different
bipartite representations (with corresponding matrices):
(1) The binary matchups A in which the element Aij
equals 1 if pitcher i faced batter j at any point and 0
otherwise; (2) the weighted matchups W in which the
element Wij equals the number of times that i faced j;
and (3) the weighted outcomes M in which the element
Mij equals a “score” or performance index, which in the
case of picther-batter matchups is determined using what
are known in baseball as “sabermetric” statistics (see the
discussion below) [13, 14, 19], characterizing the results
of all matchups between i and j. For each of these bipar-
tite pitcher–batter networks, we also utilize correspond-
ing square adjacency matrices:
Aˆ =
(
0 A
A
T
0
)
, Wˆ =
(
0 W
W
T
0
)
, Mˆ =
(
0 −M
M
T
0
)
,
so that they are appropriately symmetric (Aˆ and Wˆ) and
anti-symmetric (Mˆ). We construct and analyze each of
these representations for the single-season networks and
the aggregate (career) network that contains all pitcher–
batter interactions between 1954 and 2008.
To identify the changes in the organization of base-
ball networks, we examine the graph properties of single-
season networks. The number of distinct opponents
per player, given by the distribution of player degree
ki =
∑
j Aˆij , follows an exponential distribution for a
large range and then has an even faster decay in the tail
(see Fig. 2). The mean values of the geodesic path length
between nodes and of the bipartite clustering coefficient
are only somewhat larger than what would be generated
by random assemblages (see Appendix A). However, as
with mutually-beneficial interactions in ecological net-
works [20], the mutually-antagonistic baseball matchup
networks exhibit non-trivial relationships between player
degree and player strength si =
∑
j Wˆij , which repre-
sents the total number of opponents of a player (counting
multiplicity) [1, 17]. As shown in Fig. 3A, the relation
between strength and degree is closely approximated by
a power law s ∼ kα that starts in 1954 at α ≈ 1.64 for
pitchers and α ≈ 1.41 for batters but approaches α ≈ 1
for each by 2008. The six-decade trend of a decreasing
power-law exponent indicates how real-life events such
as the increase in the number of baseball teams through
league expansion (e.g., in the 1960s, 1977, 1993, and
1998), reorganization (e.g., in 1994, to three divisions in
each league instead of two), interleague play (in 1997),
and unbalanced schedules (in 2001) have modified the
organization of the networks.
An important property mediating the competition dy-
namics of mutualistic networks in ecology is nestedness
[9]. Although the definition of nestedness may vary, a
network is said to be nested when low-degree nodes inter-
act with proper subsets of the interactions of high-degree
nodes [18] (see Fig. 1). To calculate the aggregate nested-
ness in the binary matchup network A, we employed the
nestedness metric based on overlap and decreasing fill
(NODF) [21], which takes values between [0, 1], where
1 designates a perfectly-nested network (see Appendix
A). Figure 3B (black circles) shows that single-season
baseball networks consistently have nestedness values of
approximately 0.28. This value is slightly but consis-
tently higher than those in randomized versions of the
networks with similar distribution of interactions (red
squares) [18], which we also observe to decrease slightly
in time. In common with bipartite cooperative networks,
this confirms that nestedness is a significant feature of
these mutually-antagonistic networks.
Although nestedness is defined as a global character-
istic of the network, we can also calculate the individ-
ual contribution of each node to the overall nestedness
3[21]. Comparing node degrees and individual nestedness
(see Appendix A) before 1973, batters and pitchers col-
lapse well onto separate curves (see Fig. 3C). Starting in
1973, however, each of these split into two curves (see
Fig. 3D), corresponding to players in the two different
leagues: the American League (AL) and the National
League (NL). This structural change presumably resulted
from the AL’s 1973 introduction of the designated hitter
(DH), a batter who never fields but bats in place of the
team’s pitchers (see Fig. 1), apparently causing the AL to
become less nested due to the replacement of low-degree
batting pitchers with higher-degree DHs. This suggests,
as we discuss below, that the network position of a player
might affect his own ranking (while, of course, network
position is strongly influenced by a player’s longevity and,
thus, by his performance).
III. BIASED RANDOM WALKERS
To compare the performance of players, we rank play-
ers by analyzing biased random walkers on the bipar-
tite network M encoding the outcomes of all mutually-
antagonistic interactions between each player pair. Our
method generalizes the technique we previously used for
NCAA football teams [15, 16], allowing us to rank play-
ers in individual seasons and in the 1954–2008 career net-
work, yielding a quantitative, conceptually-clear method
for ranking baseball players that takes a rather different
approach from other sabermetric methods used to project
player performance such as DiamondMind (which uses
Monte Carlo simulations), PECOTA (which uses histor-
ical players as a benchmark), and CHONE (which uses
regression models) [22, 23].
To describe the aggregate interaction Mij between
pitcher i and batter j, we need to quantify each possible
individual pitcher–batter outcome. For simplicity, we fo-
cus on the quantity runs to end of inning (RUE) [14],
which assigns a value to each possible plate appearance
outcome (single, home run, strikeout, etc.) based on the
expected number of runs that a team would obtain be-
fore the end of that inning, independent of the situational
context (see Appendix B for specific values). Higher
numbers indicate larger degrees of success for the batting
team. For each season, we add the RUE from each plate
appearance of pitcher i versus batter j to obtain a cumu-
lative RUE for the pair. Note that any performance index
that assigns a value to a specific mutually-antagonistic
interaction can be used in place of RUE without chang-
ing the rest of our ranking algorithm. We then define the
single-season outcome elementMij by the cumulative ex-
tent to which the batter’s outcome is better (Mij > 0) or
worse (Mij < 0) than the mean outcome over all pitcher–
batter matchups that season. When defining the career
outcome elementMij for 1954–2008, we account for base-
ball’s modern era offensive inflation [13, 14] by summing
over individual seasons (i.e., relative to mean outcomes
on a per season basis).
We initiate our ranking methodology by considering
independent random walkers who each cast a single vote
for the player that they believe is the best. Each walker
occasionally changes its vote with a probability deter-
mined by considering the aggregate outcome of a single
pitcher–batter pairing, selected randomly from those in-
volving their favorite player, and by a parameter quanti-
fying the bias of the walker to move towards the winner of
the accumulated outcome. A random walker that is con-
sidering the outcome described by this matchup is biased
towards but not required to choose the pitcher (batter)
as the better player if Mij < 0 (Mij > 0).
The expected rate of change of the number of votes
cast for each player in the random walk is quantified by a
homogeneous system of linear differential equations v′ =
D · v, where
Dij =
{
Wˆij + rMˆij , i 6= j
−si + r
∑
k Mˆik , i = j .
(1)
The long-time average fraction of walkers v˜j residing at
(i.e., voting for) player j is then found by solving the
linear algebraic systemD·v˜ = 0, subject to an additional
constraint that
∑
j v˜j = 1. If the bias parameter r > 0,
successful players will on average be ranked more highly.
For r < 0, the random walker votes will instead tend
toward the “loser” of individual matchups.
Equation (1) gives a general one-parameter system for
a biased walker with probabilities that are linear in RUE,
but the approach is easily generalized by using other
functional forms to map observed plate appearance out-
comes (in M) into selection probabilities. By restricting
our attention to a form that is linear in RUE, the in-
terpretation that the off-diagonal components of D cor-
respond to random walker rate coefficients requires that
these components remain non-negative, a preferable state
that leads to a number of beneficial properties in the
resulting matrix. For example, this allows us to apply
the Perron-Frobenius theorem, which guarantees the ex-
istence of an equilibrium v˜ with strictly positive entries
(and similarly guarantees the existence of positive solu-
tions in algorithms such as PageRank) [16, 17, 24, 25].
In practice, this requirement is equivalent in the base-
ball networks to |r| . 0.7, so that the result of a home
run in a single plate-appearance matchup (i.e., the case
in which a batter faces a pitcher exactly once and hits
a home run in that appearance) maintains a small but
non-negative chance that a corresponding random walker
will still select the pitcher.
However, because the aggregate outcome of most pair-
ings remains close to the mean, the bias in the random
walk is small, and the rankings become essentially inde-
pendent of the bias parameter. The linear expansion in
bias r thereby yields a ranking with no remaining param-
eters beyond the statistically-selected RUE values, given
by v˜ = v(0) + rV + O(r2) . Generalizing the similar ex-
pansion described in detail in Ref. [16], the zeroth-order
term results in a constant number of votes per player,
4and the additional contribution at first order is given by
the solution of a discrete Poisson equation on the graph:
∑
j
LijVj =
4
n
∑
j
Mˆij , (2)
subject to the neutral charge constraint
∑
j Vj = 0. (By
analogy with electrostatics, we refer to Vj as the RUE
‘charge’ of node j.) In equation (2), n = P+B is the total
number of players, L = S−Wˆ is the graph Laplacian, S
is the diagonal matrix with elements sii =
∑
j Wˆij (and
sij = 0 for i 6= j). Accordingly, we restrict our attention
to the first-order ranking specified by V and obtained
using the solution of equation (2).
We tabulate this rank ordering separately for pitch-
ers and batters, for individual seasons and the full career
network. We compare the results of the random walker
ranking to major baseball awards in Table I. We note
that the rankings are highly correlated with the under-
lying RUE per plate appearance of each player (r ≈ .96
for 2008 and similar for other seasons), so that the top
players in the rankings produced by our method have a
strong but imperfect correlation with the lists produced
by ranking players according to raw RUE values. (This
similarly holds for any other sabermetric quantity that
one might use in place of RUE.) That is, it matters
which players one has faced, and that is codified by the
network. We note, for example, that the differences be-
tween random walker rankings and raw RUE rankings
appear to appropriately capture the caliber of opponents
(for example, pitchers from teams with relatively ane-
mic offenses—such as the 2008 Nationals, Astros, and
Reds—have a higher ranking in the random walker rank-
ing, reflecting that they never had the good fortune of
going up against their own teams’ batters). We also
compared the rankings with a leading metric in baseball
analysis, ESPN’s MLB Player Ratings, which combines
ratings from ESPN, Elias, Inside Edge, and The Baseball
Encyclopedia [26]. Of the top 99 players for 2008 who are
listed in the Player Ratings, 12 did not meet our thresh-
old for plate appearances. Comparing the random walker
results for the remaining 87 players with the Player Rat-
ings yields a r ≈ .5601 correlation. We thus proceed to
study the random walker results for the full career rank-
ing both with confidence that it correlates with methods
currently used for single-season analysis and caution that
the ranking details do not capture all effects according to
current best practices in quantitative baseball analysis
[27].
The full career ranking allows credible comparisons be-
tween players from different eras. Interestingly, consider-
ing the rankings restricted to individuals who played in
at least 10 seasons during this time (HOF-eligible play-
ers), we find that Barry Bonds (batter), Pedro Martinez
(pitcher), and Mariano Rivera (relief pitcher) are the best
players (in these categories) from 1954 to 2008. We show
additional rankings in Table II. We especially note that
Albert Belle (29th among batters) is ranked much higher
than Jim Rice (115th), suggesting that Belle’s hitting
performance perhaps merits HOF membership more than
that of Rice. Similarly, Bert Blyleven ranks higher not
only than current HOF competitors such as Jack Morris
and Tommy John but also higher than three HOF pitch-
ers with over 300 wins (Steve Carlton, Phil Niekro, and
Don Sutton), which is one traditional benchmark for se-
lecting elite pitchers. Direct comparison with other rank
orderings of players across different eras would necessi-
tate restriction to sufficiently similar time periods and
is thus beyond the network-science focus of the present
study.
IV. LINKING STRUCTURE TO
PERFORMANCE
As previously suggested, the network architecture
should have important effects on the performance of
players. In particular, central players in the network
might have a systematic advantage in the rankings rel-
ative to those who are not as well connected. Such
structurally-important players (see Table II for exam-
ples), who have high values for both betweenness cen-
trality and nestedness, have had long—and usually ex-
tremely successful—careers, so it is of significant interest,
yet difficult, to gauge the coupled effects on their rank
ordering from statistical success versus structural role in
the network. In fact, we found no correlation (r ≈ 0.001)
between a player’s position—i.e., individual nestedness
and betweenness—and his success measured by the frac-
tion of votes received.
Hence, we investigate this connection further via the
correlation between the sensitivity of rankings to changes
in outcomes in individual pitcher–batter pairs, which is
formulated using the Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of
the graph Laplacian. Consider changing the outcome
of the single edge that corresponds to the aggregate
matchup between players i and j. If we increase the
former’s aggregate RUE by a unit amount at the ex-
pense of the latter, then the total RMS change in votes
V is proportional to the difference between the ith and
jth columns of L+. This difference yields a node-centric
measure of the sensitivities of rankings to individual per-
formances: the constraint
∑
i L
+
ij = 0 yields that L
+
ii (the
diagonal element of the graph Laplacian pseudo-inverse),
the direct control that player i has over his own ranking,
is equal and opposite to the total change his performance
directly imposes on the rest of the network. Additionally,
as illustrated in Fig. 4A, the quantity L+ii is closely re-
lated to the RMS changes in votes across the network
due to the performance of player i.
Noting that the element L+ii is related to the mean
of the commute times between nodes i and j (averag-
ing over all j) [28], specifically under our constraints, the
sum of the commute times tij = L
+
ii + L
+
jj − 2L
+
ij over
j yields a linear function of L+ii . Consequently, L
+
ii pro-
vides a node-based measure of the average distance from
5node i to the rest of the network. This definition of av-
erage commute time has similarities with the measures
known as information centrality [29] and random walk
centrality [30] (though the results of applying the differ-
ent measures can still be quite different). The negative
relationship between L+ii and both betweenness central-
ity and nestedness, which we show in Fig. 5, thus yields
a corresponding negative relationship between the mean
commute distance and the betweenness and nestedness
of a player. A player who is highly embedded in the
network (i.e., one with high individual nestedness) has a
small mean commute distance to the rest of the network,
and the ranking of that player is not very sensitive to
the outcome of a single matchup. In contrast, a player
who is in the periphery of the network (i.e., one with low
individual nestedness) typically has a very large mean
commute distance to other portions of the graph, and
his place in the ranking-ordering is consequently much
more sensitive to the results of his individual matchups
[41]. This would suggest that players in the AL tend on
average to be more prone to changes in their own rank-
ings than players in the NL (see Fig. 3D).
Remarkably, we can make these general notions much
more precise, as L+ii ≈ s
−1
i , where we recall that si is
the strength of node i (see Fig. 4B). Some similarities
between these quantities is reasonably expected (cf. the
role of relaxation times in a similar relationship with ran-
dom walk centrality in Ref. [30], which can be quantified
by an eigenvalue analysis). This simple relationship be-
lies a stunning organizational principle of this network:
The global quantity of average commute time of a node is
well-approximated by its strength, a simple local quan-
tity. That is, in the appropriate perturbation analysis
to approximate the Laplacian pseudo-inverse, the higher
order terms essentially cancel out, contributing little be-
yond the (zeroth-order) local contribution. We also found
a rougher relationship for nestedness and betweenness
(see Fig. 6).
These results have two interesting implications. First,
they reveal that the success of well-connected players de-
pends fundamentally on a strong aggregate performance
rather than just on their position in the network. Sec-
ond, they imply that neophyte players would need to
face well-connected players if they want to establish a
stronger connection to the network and a ranking that is
less vulnerable to single matchups. Similarly, recent re-
search on mutualistic networks in ecology has found that
neophyte species experience lower competition pressures
by linking to well-connected species [9]. Our findings on
baseball-player rankings suggest the possibility of finding
similar competition patterns in mutually-antagonistic in-
teractions in ecological and social networks.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Drawing on ideas from network science and ecology,
we have analyzed the structure and time-evolution of
mutually-antagonistic interaction networks in baseball.
We considered a simple ranking system based on biased
random walks on the graphs and used it to compare
player performance in individual seasons and across en-
tire careers. We emphasize that our ranking methodology
is overly simplistic, having noted several considerations
that one might use to improve it (see, e.g., Appendix B)
while maintaining a network framework that accounts for
which players each player has faced. We also examined
how the player rankings and their sensitivities depend on
node-centric network characteristics.
We expect that similar considerations might be useful
for developing a better understanding of the interplay be-
tween structure and function in a broad class of compet-
itive networks, such as those formed by antigen-antibody
interactions, species competition for resources, and com-
pany competition for consumers. Given the motivation
from ecology, we are optimistic that this might lead to
interesting ecological insights, compensating for the dif-
ficulty in collecting data on the regulatory dynamics of
mutually-antagonistic networks in ecology—such as the
ones formed by parasites and free-living species [11]—or
assessing the potential performance of invasive species
from different environments [31].
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APPENDIX A: QUANTITIES FOR BIPARTITE
NETWORKS
Here, we review some important quantities for bipar-
tite networks and discuss their values for the baseball
matchup networks.
A clustering coefficient for bipartite networks can be
defined by [32]
C4,mn(i) =
qimn
(km − ηimn) + (kn − ηimn) + qimn
, (A1)
6where qimn is the number of complete squares involving
nodes i, m, and n; ηimn = 1+ qimn enforces the require-
ment in bipartite graphs that there are no links between
nodes of the same population; and we recall that ki is
the degree of node i. Hence, the numerator in (A1) gives
the actual number of squares and the denominator gives
the maximum possible number of possible squares. For
the single-sason baseball networks, we calculate the ratio
rc = 〈C4〉/〈C4r〉 between the mean clustering coefficient
〈C4〉 summed over all nodes i and the mean clustering
coefficient 〈C4r〉 generated by a randomization of the net-
work that preserves the original degree distribution [33].
We found that baseball networks have average clustering
coefficients that are just above that of random networks.
Interestingly, the ratio rc decreases gradually (and al-
most monotonically from one season to the next) from
rc ≈ 2.5 in 1954 to rc ≈ 1.3 in 2008.
The geodesic betweenness centrality of nodes over the
unweighted network Aˆ is defined by [1, 34]
b(i) =
∑
j,k
∆j,k(i)
dj,k
, (A2)
where ∆j,k(i) is the number of shortest paths between
players j and k that pass through player i and dj,k is
the total number of shortest paths between players j and
k. For the single-season baseball networks, we calculate
the ratio rb = 〈b〉/〈br〉 between the mean path length
〈b〉 summed over all nodes i and the mean path length
〈br〉 generated by a randomization of the network that
preserves the degree distribution [33]. As with cluster-
ing coefficients, we found that the mean path lengths of
baseball networks are only slightly larger than those of
random networks, finding in particular that rb ∈ (1, 3)
[35].
Nestedness is an important concept that has been ap-
plied to ecological communities, in which species present
in sites with low biodiversity are also present in sites
with high biodiversity [36]. Although the general no-
tion of nestedness may vary, the concept has nonethe-
less been employed quite successfully in the analysis of
ecological networks [18]. In a nested network, interac-
tions between two classes of nodes (e.g., plants and ani-
mals) are arranged so that low-degree nodes interact with
proper subsets of the interactions of high-degree nodes.
A nested network contains not only a core of high-degree
nodes that interact with each other but also an impor-
tant set of asymmetric links (i.e., connections between
high-degree and low-degree nodes). The importance of
nestedness measures is twofold: (1) they give a sense of
network organization; and (2) they have significant im-
plications for the stability and robustness of ecological
networks [9, 18].
To avoid biases in nestedness based on network size
(i.e., the number of nodes), degree distribution, and other
structural properties, we employ the nestedness calcu-
lations introduced recently in Ref. [18]. The aggregate
nestedness is given by [21]
NODF =
∑
i,j Ni,j +
∑
l,mNl,m
([P (P − 1)/2] + [B(B − 1)/2])
. (A3)
For every pair of pitchers (i and j), the quantity Ni,j is
equal to 0 if ki ≤ kj and is equal to the fraction of com-
mon opponents if ki > kj . We also define a similar quan-
tity for every pair of batters (l and m). The nestedness
metric takes values between [0, 1], where 1 designates a
perfectly-nested network and 0 indicates a network with
no nestedness.
The NODF nestedness also allows us to calculate the
individual nestedness of each pitcher (column) or batter
(row) using the equation
z(i) =
∑
j
Ni,j/(T − 1) , (A4)
where T = P (total number of columns) for pitchers,
T = B (total number of rows) for batters and Ni,j is cal-
culated as above. In this way, the individual nestedness
metric takes values between [0, 1], where 1 designates a
perfectly-nested individual and 0 indicates an individual
with no nestedness.
The null model used to compare the empirical nested-
ness is given by [18]
q(i, j) =
ki
2B
+
kj
2P
, (A5)
where qi,j is the occupation probability of a pairwise in-
teraction between node i and node j, and we recall that
B and P are, respectively, the total number of nodes j
(batters) and nodes i (pitchers) in the network. In a bi-
partite network, j and i represent two different types of
nodes, so qi,j is the mean of the occupation probabilities
of the row and column. Recent studies have shown that
model-generated nestedness values extracted from this
null model lower the probability of incorrectly determin-
ing an empirical nested structure to be significant [21].
For baseball networks, we calculated the standard error—
given by Z = (NODF − 〈NODF 〉)/σ, where NODF
corresponds to the nestedness values of the empirical net-
works and 〈NODF 〉 and σ are, respectively, the average
and standard deviations of nestedness values of random
replicates generated by the null model. For the base-
ball networks, we found that Z > 3 for all seasons (see
Fig. 3B).
APPENDIX B: DEFINITION OF RUNS TO END
OF INNING (RUE)
To quantify the outcome of each plate appearance,
we used the sabermetric quantity runs to end of inning
(RUE) [14], which assigns a value to each of the possible
outcomes in a plate appearance based on the expected
number of runs a team would obtain before the end of
7that inning following that event, independent of game
context. (RUE can also be adjusted by subtracting the
initial run state [27].) Higher numbers indicate larger de-
grees of success for the batting team. The batter events
(and their associated numerical RUE values) are generic
out (0.240), strikeout (0.207), walk (0.845), hit by pitch
(0.969), interference (1.132), fielder’s choice (0.240), sin-
gle (1.025), double (1.311), triple (1.616), and home run
(1.942).
Note that we are ignoring events such as passed balls
and stolen bases that can occur in addition to the above
outcomes in a given plate appearance. This might lead to
some undervaluing in the ranking for a small number of
position players (such as Tim Raines) that rely on stolen
bases. We also considered the metric known as weighted
on base average (wOBA) [37], and note that any metric
that assigns a value to a specific plate appearance can be
used in place of RUE without changing the rest of our
ranking algorithm. This includes, in particular, popular
sabermetric quantities such as win shares and value over
replacement player (VORP) [12, 14]. One can also incor-
porate ideas like ballpark effects into the metric employed
at this stage of the algorithm without changing any other
part of the method. Although it would make the method-
ology more complicated (in contrast to our goals), it is
also possible to generalize the algorithm to include more
subtle effects such as estimates for when player perfor-
mance peaks and how it declines over a long career. Some
of the active players in the data set have not yet entered
a declining phase in their careers and might have higher
rankings now than they will when their careers are over.
We expect that the relatively high rankings of modern
players versus ones who retired long ago might also result
in part from the increased performance discrepancy be-
tween the top players and average players in the present
era versus what used to be the case and in part from
performing well against the larger number of relatively
poor players occupying rosters because of expansion [38].
Finally, we note that batter–pitcher matchups are not
fully random but contain significant correlations (e.g.,
in a given baseball game, the entire lineup of one team
has plate appearances against the other team’s starting
pitcher) that can be incorporated to generalize the ran-
dom walker process itself [27].
To include the outcome of players who did not have
many plate appearances without skewing their rankings
via small samples, we separately accumulate the results
for all pitchers and batters with fewer than some thresh-
old number of plate appearances K into a single “re-
placement pitcher” and “replacement batter” to repre-
sent these less prominent players. In the results pre-
sented in this paper, we used the threshold K = 500
both for single seasons and for the collective outcome ma-
trix. Note that similar thresholds exist when determin-
ing single-season leadership in quantities such as batting
average (which requires 3.1 plate appearances per team
game, yielding 502 in a 162-game season) and earned run
average (1 inning per team game).
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9TABLE I: Single-Season Awards and Random Walker Rankings. We show the MVP and CY Young award winners for various
years from 1954 to 2008. In parentheses, we give the rank-order of the player within his own category (pitcher or batter) that
we obtained using our random walker ranking system applied to the corresponding baseball season. For most of the seasons,
there is good agreement between award winners and their random walker ranking. (Note that the Cy Young award was awarded
to a single pitcher—rather than one from each league—until 1967.)
1954 1958 1963
MVP (AL) Yogi Berra (11th) Jackie Jensen (8th) Elston Howard (20th)
MVP (NL) Willie Mays (2nd) Ernie Banks (6th) Sandy Koufax (1st)
Cy Young (AL) N/A Bob Turley (14th) Sandy Koufax (1st)
Cy Young (NL) N/A Bob Turley (14th) Sandy Koufax (1st)
1968 1973 1978
MVP (AL) Denny McLain (4th) Reggie Jackson (11th) Jim Rice (3rd)
MVP (NL) Bob Gibson (1st) Pete Rose (6th) Dave Parker (1st)
Cy Young (AL) Denny McLain (4th) Jim Palmer (13th) Ron Guidry (1st)
Cy Young (NL) Bob Gibson (1st) Tom Seaver (1st) Gaylord Perry (30th)
1983 1988 1993
MVP (AL) Cal Ripken Jr. (11th) Jose Canseco (3rd) Frank Thomas (3rd)
MVP (NL) Dale Murphy (3rd) Kirk Gibson (17th) Barry Bonds (1st)
Cy Young (AL) LaMarr Hoyt (21st) Frank Viola (24th) Jack McDowell (17th)
Cy Young (NL) John Denny (14th) Orel Hershiser (7th) Greg Maddux (3rd)
1998 2003 2008
MVP (AL) Juan Gonzalez (18th) Alex Rodriguez (7th) Dustin Pedroia (23rd)
MVP (NL) Sammy Sosa (7th) Barry Bonds (1st) Albert Pujols (1st)
Cy Young (AL) Roger Clemens (3rd) Roy Halladay (15th) Cliff Lee (8th)
Cy Young (NL) Tom Glavine (10th) Eric Gagne (8th) Tim Lincecum (1st)
Btw(P) N(P) R(RP) R(SP) Btw(B) N(B) R(B)
Nolan Ryan Jamie Moyer Mariano Rivera Pedro Martinez Julio Franco Rickey Henderson Barry Bonds
Jim Kaat Roger Clemens Billy Wagner Roger Clemens Rickey Henderson Barry Bonds Todd Helton
Tommy John Greg Maddux Troy Percival Roy Halladay Carl Yastrzemski Steve Finley Mickey Mantle
Dennis Eckersley Mike Morgan Trevor Hoffman Curt Schilling Hank Aaron Craig Biggio Manny Ramirez
Jamie Moyer Randy Johnson Tom Henke Sandy Koufax Pete Rose Gary Sheffield Frank Thomas
Greg Maddux David Wells B. J. Ryan Randy Johnson Tony Perez Ken Griffey Jr. Willie Mays
Charlie Hough Kenny Rogers Armando Benitez John Smoltz Joe Morgan Luis Gonzalez Mark McGwire
Don Sutton Terry Mulholland John Wetteland Mike Mussina Dave Winfield Julio Franco Alex Rodriguez
Phil Niekro Jose Mesa Keith Foulke J. R. Richard Ken Griffey Jr. Jeff Kent Larry Walker
Roger Clemens Tom Glavine Rob Nen Greg Maddux Al Kaline Omar Vizquel Vladimir Guerrero
TABLE II: Player Rankings. Top 10 pitchers (P) and batters (B) according to geodesic node betweenness (Btw), nestedness
(N), and random walker ranking (R). Pitchers are divided into relief pitchers (RP) and starting pitchers (SP). In accordance
with HOF eligibility, this table only includes players who played at least 10 seasons between 1954 and 2008. Note that if we
consider all players with careers of at least 10 seasons, no matter how many of those seasons occurred between 1954 and 2008,
the only change is that Ted Williams becomes the highest-ranking batter. If we consider all players with at least 8 seasons, the
only additional change is that Albert Pujols is ranked just behind Barry Bonds.
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FIG. 1: Bipartite Baseball Networks. (A) A subset of the bipartite interactions between pitchers (left column) and batters
(right column) during the 1989 baseball season. The area of each circle is determined by the node degree (i.e., how many
different opponents were faced). Each line indicates that a given pitcher faced a given batter, and the darkness of each line is
proportional to the number of plate appearances that occurred (i.e., the node strength). (B) The matrix encoding the complete
set of bipartite interactions from 1989, with pitchers (columns) and batters (rows) arranged from the lowest to the highest
node degree. An element of the matrix is black if that particular pitcher and batter faced each other and white if they did not.
Observe the presence of a core of high-degree players that are heavily connected to each other (top right corner), an important
presence of asymmetric interactions (i.e., high-degree players connected to low-degree players), and a dearth of connections
between low-degree players (bottom left corner), which are all characteristics of nested networks [18]. Some of the batters are
actually pitchers (e.g., Mitch Williams), as National League pitchers (and, since 1997, also American League pitchers) have a
chance to bat and face a small number of pitchers while at the plate.
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FIG. 2: [Color online] Cumulative Degree Distribution. Semi-log plot of the cumulative degree distribution Pcum(k) for pitchers
and batters in the career (1954–2008) network. The empirical data (dots) are arranged in logarithmic bins.
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FIG. 3: [Color online] Time Evolution and Summary Statistics of the Baseball Networks. Panel A shows the relation between
player degree k and player strength s from 1954 to 2008. The vertical axis gives the value of the exponent α in the power-law
relationship s ∼ kα (see the discussion in the main text), where we observe that α tends to decrease as a function of time.
Shuffling the strengths in the network while keeping the player degrees fixed yields a power-law relationship with α ≈ 1 for all
years. Blue circles denote pitchers and gray crosses denote batters. Each error bar corresponds to one standard deviation. The
inset shows on a log-log scale the relationship between degree k and strength s for the 2008 season. Panel B shows the time
evolution of the network’s nestedness (which we defined using the NODF metric [21]). Black circles and red squares represent,
respectively, the values for the original data and the standard null model II [18]. Each error bar again corresponds to one
standard deviation. Panels C and D show, respectively, the relationship between node degree and individual nestedness for the
1972 and 1973 networks. For comparison purposes, the degree of pitchers and batters are respectively scaled by a multiplicative
factor of P/l and B/l, where P is the number of pitchers, B is the number of batters, and l is the number of undirected edges
in the network. In 1973, the American League introduced the designated hitter rule, which caused a significant change in the
structure of subsequent networks. Between 1954 and 1972, pitchers and batters each collapse onto a single curve. From 1973 to
2008, however, pitchers and batters each yield two distinct curves, revealing a division between the American league (bottom)
and National League (top).
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FIG. 4: [Color online] Network Quantities versus Graph Laplacian. We plot the diagonal elements of the Moore-Penrose
pseudo-inverse of the graph Laplacian of the network L+
ii
versus (A) the root mean squared change of votes across the network
due to the RUE ‘charge’ at each node and (B) node strength. In each case, we use logarithmic coordinates on both axes. We
note in particular the L+
ii
≈ s−1
i
relationship in panel B.
10−3 10−2 10−1 100
10−7
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
Lii
+
Be
tw
ee
ne
ss
A
10−3 10−2 10−1 100
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
Lii
+
In
di
vid
ua
l N
es
te
dn
es
s
B
FIG. 5: [Color online] Betweenness and Nestedness versus Graph Laplacian. We plot the diagonal elements of the Moore-Penrose
pseudo-inverse of the graph Laplacian of the network versus (A) node betweenness and (B) individual nestedness.
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FIG. 6: [Color online] Degree, Strength, Betweenness, and Nestedness. We show a log-log plot of (A) player degree k versus
betweenness centrality and (B) degree versus individual nestedness in the career networks. The insets show the analogous
relationships obtained by replacing degree with strength s. Pitchers are given by blue dots, and batters are given by gray
crosses. Pitchers with betweenness b ≈ 2e−4 and low degree k tend to be position players who made a few pitching appearances
(e.g., Keith Osik), pitchers with short careers (e.g., Wascar Serrano), or recent pitchers with few Major League appearances
(e.g., John Van Beschoten, who has split time between the Major Leagues and the Minor Leagues since 2004).
